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PETER HENNING*

CRIMINALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW
The Impact of Criminal Sanctions on Corporate
Misconduct

I WANT TO BEGIN BY CONSIDERING A POINT MADE BY Joan Heminway and Dean
Rothenberg's statement about her losses on WorldCom stock. When Dean Rothenberg talked about her investment in WorldCom, I suspect if you asked her how she
felt about losing all that money she would say that she was robbed. For those of you
who teach criminal law, you know she was not robbed, she was perhaps a victim of
a larceny, but robbery requires use of force.' Criminal law uses a different terminology than corporate law, and we need to be careful about mixing the terms together.
When I looked through the list of what the participants in this Conference teach,
I noticed one unique thing about me, which is I think I am the only one here who
teaches corporate law and criminal law at the same time; of course, corporate law
to the Marxist is criminal law. I wonder whether a better title for this Conference,

at least from my perspective, is "The Corporatization of Criminal Law" rather that
"The Criminalization of Corporate Law."
It was interesting listening to Joan ask how the criminal law serves the purposes
of Section 10(b) 2 and Rule lOb-5, 3 the primary anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. I confess that I have never heard it phrased quite that way, and it
raises an interesting point, whether criminal law should be viewed as serving the
purposes of the securities law and corporate law in general.
I want to raise a couple of issues here. Should corporate (or securities) law be
driving the criminal law analysis, and how much should corporate law issues, or
more broadly the corporate law agenda, be injected into criminal law? The two
areas of the law not only have a different vocabulary, but also very different goals
for the application of the law in specific cases. For example, retribution is one of
the theories for why certain conduct is punished as criminal,4 but that rationale is
foreign to corporate law. I am not aware of any discussion in corporate law about a
retributivist theory of corporate governance, except perhaps for closely-held corpo.
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rations in which a controlling shareholder might be punished for squeezing out a

minority shareholder, even in that context the language of punishment is quite
different from the criminal law analysis.
Another concept widely discussed in the corporate arena, but largely foreign to
criminal law, is the idea of agency costs. I have read discussions on blogs, such as
the ones written by Christine Hurt' and Larry Ribstein,6 talking about the so-called
"criminalization of agency costs" in prosecutions of corporate executives such as
Ken Lay, Jeff Skilling, and Bernie Ebbers. I am not sure exactly what this concept
means, but if the point is that corporations involve certain risk-taking by their
managers that may result in them acting inappropriately or even illegally, and those
risks should not be subject to criminal prosecution, then I do not know if that is a
legitimate basis to criticize the prosecutions of corporate officers from a criminal
law perspective.
The idea of criminalizing agency costs brings to mind whether there are other
examples of what might also be viewed as a criminalization of agency costs that are
clearly crimes and would not be subject to the same criticism. For example, what if
a congressman accepted a bag of cash and said, "Thank you, I planned to vote for
this measure anyway, but to make this look acceptable let's call it a campaign contribution." The congressman then puts the bag of cash into a safe, or perhaps a
freezer, and votes on the measure. If the congressman and the payer were prosecuted for the payment of the bribe, or perhaps an unlawful gratuity, would that
simply be criminalizing the agency cost that our elected officials might take money
for doing their jobs? I do not think any of us are willing to see congressmen accept
bags of cash, and the recent sentencing of former Congressman Randy "Duke"
Cunningham to eight years in jail for taking secret kickbacks from contractors
seeking favors is a good example of how unacceptable such conduct is.7 Why is it
that if a corporate executive manipulates the books of a company to make its numbers appear better, that is an impermissible criminalizing of agency costs?
Criminal law is about the moral condemnation of the community,' and that is
certainly a very different rationale from corporate law.' I think we can see that each
area of the law has a different set of goals. Criminal law is not designed for efficient
corporate governance; it is designed to deter criminal conduct and to exact retribution from those who violate moral norms.
The criminal law involves certain moral concepts. While that is also true to a
degree in securities regulation, which tries to eliminate deception and encourage
5. See Posting of Christine Hurt to The Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2OO7/O3/theundercivili.html (Mar. 2, 2007).
6. See Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/corporatecrime/
index.html (Jan. 4, 2006, 05:27 CST).
7. See Information, United States v. Cummingham, No. 05er2137-LAB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005).
8. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401, 405 (1958).
9. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1552
(1989).
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full disclosure, I do not know whether corporate or securities law should be conflated with criminal law. In corporate law, you hear about and want to encourage
the efficient allocation of capital. That is not a concept that is important in criminal law, whereas moral condemnation of a person's conduct is the core issue. Allocating capital in a private enterprise is often amoral, or at least does not revolve
around determining what communal standards should govern how individuals act.
So when Joan Heminway mentioned the need for a swift and sure result in criminal prosecutions, from my criminal law background I am not sure if that is a
proper goal. Certainly the rules of criminal procedure, which are almost wholly
inapplicable to corporate law, do not make a "swift and sure result" a central goal
of the criminal justice system. Indeed, sometimes defense lawyers do not want a
swift and sure resolution of the case, especially after a conviction and before sentencing when a client might be enjoying the last days of freedom before a long stint
in prison. White collar crime cases are not the only ones in which justice may not
be particularly swift. Some murder cases can take months, even years, to come to
trial, and I do not think that efficiency is really going to be the primary goal in the
criminal process in those instances. A much more important goal in the criminal
justice system is certainty, not haste. This is shown, in particular, by the allocation
of the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution on the government to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accuracy is the greatest concern.
In closing, I would like to throw out another thought, and then I will pass the
floor to others who are much more qualified in this area. As we look at prosecutions of corporations and their officers, are we really asking: do we want the corporation to operate better? Or is the goal here more to protect society? And can we
put the two together? Prosecutions of corporations are inefficient, and clearly not a
good way to regulate corporations. At the same time, however, I do not know if the
civil litigation system is working all that well in regulating corporations as some
might think. I have not seen a swift and sure securities class action case, unless you
get the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's dismissal provision in there,
which can knock out a case rather quickly.'" I do not know if there is an engine for
determining how corporations should be regulated efficiently.
Perhaps the simple reality is to ask whether corporations are going to be prosecuted in the future. The answer, I believe, is "Yes." We have had corporate criminal
liability in this country since 1909," and it is firmly entrenched in the American
criminal justice system. As David Anders noted, it is not going away.' 2 Does it get
overused? That may be an interesting point about this era: Is the criminal law being
overused in prosecuting corporations and should we pull back? Regardless of the

10. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2006).
11. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (holding that
corporations may be held criminally liable for the acts of an authorized agent).
12. David Anders, Criminalization of CorporateLaw, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. __ (2007).
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answer to that question, the criminal prosecution of corporations and their executives is not ending any time soon, and I do not think that is a bad thing.
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